BEFORE THE MERCER ISLAND ETHICS OFFICER

In the Matter of

August 03, 2020 Ethics Complaint Against Planning Commission Member Lucia Pirzio-Biroli **DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY**

I. <u>INTRODUCTION – AUTHORITY</u>

Chapter 2.60 of the Mercer Island City Code ("MICC") constitutes the "Code of Ethics" enacted to "govern the conduct of members of the city council, the city's boards and commissions, and council-appointed task groups or committees." *MICC 2.60.010.A*. The purpose of the Code of Ethics is to ensure a "fair, ethical and accountable local government that has earned the public's full confidence." *MICC 2.60.010.B*. To that purpose, the Code of Ethics contains a listing list of prohibited conduct for city officials (2.60.030), authorizes the Council to adopt a "code of ethics statement" (2.60.040), creates the position of "ethics officer... responsible for the prompt and fair enforcement of this code of ethics when necessary" (2.60.050), and generally outlines the manner in which the ethical rules are to be implemented and enforced (2.60.060-.070). The Code of Ethics applies to "all members of the city council, the city's boards and commissions, and other council-appointed task groups

DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY - 1

or committees of the city of Mercer Island who are currently serving their positions." *MICC* 2.60.020.

The Code establishes that "[a]ny person may submit a written complaint... alleging one or more violations of this code of ethics by an official." *MICC 2.60.070.A.1*. When such a complaint is received, the City Code requires it be submitted to the ethics officer, who "shall make a determination of sufficiency within 30 days of receipt of the complaint." *MICC 2.60.070.A.2*.

II. CURRENT COMPLAINT – APPOINTMENT OF ETHICS OFFICER

On August 3, 2020 the City Clerk received an ethics complaint against Planning Commission Member Lucia Pirzio-Biroli.¹ The complaint is comprised of a 1-page letter that refers to and incorporates a June 30, 2020 email from Tom Acker to various City officials. *See Exh. 1*. The essential allegation is as follows:

[T]he representatives of the new Farmer's Market Building have hired a planning commission member to evaluate the comprehensive plan as it relates to Mercer Island and advise the, of what is and is not possible under the city's code.

Exhibit 1 at p. 2.² The complaint goes on to allege that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli "has ignored feedback consistently, continued to push for large-scale development and pushed for what I call developer giveaways." Exh. 1 at p. 3. The complaint is electronically signed by 11 separate individuals: Tom Acker, Carvel Zwingle, Mathew Goldbach, Susan Lund, Rob Dunbabin, Gary Robinson, Wendy Kristek, John Hall, Jean Dunbabin, Mike Cero, and Daniel Thompson. *Id*.

¹ As a member of the Planning Commission, Ms. Pirzio-Biroli meets the definition of a city "official" to whom the Code of Ethics applies. *See MICC 2.60.020*.

² The June 30th email does not specifically identify Ms. Pirzio-Biroli in this portion, but goes on to say "If Commission Member Lucia Pirzio-Biroli is exonerated of the complaint, I would be surprised." It is therefore assumed that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is the official to whom the allegations refer.

On August 3, 2020, the City Manager appointed the undersigned to serve as the City's Ethics Officer as authorized by MICC 2.60.050. *See Exh. 2*. The same day, the City Clerk transmitted the current complaint to the undersigned, requesting a determination of sufficiency pursuant to MICC 2.60.070.A.

III. ANALYSIS

In making a determination of sufficiency under the City Code, the Ethics Officer must accept the facts alleged as true, and simply determine whether "the allegations, if established, would violate MICC 2.60.030, including Chapter 42.23 RCW." *MICC 2.60.070.A.2*. The Ethics Officer is not empowered to assess the credibility of the complainant or the complaint, interview witnesses, or otherwise make any inquiry into, or determination regarding, the facts alleged. Here, the Ethics Officer must assume – without deciding – that the following facts alleged in the complaint are true: (1) a private developer that has undertaken prior development with the City, and that plans to participate in future development in the City, has "hired" Ms. Pirzio-Biroli to provide advice on what development may be allowed under the City Code, and (2) in the course of her duties on the Planning Commission, Ms. Pirzio-Biroli "has ignored feedback consistently, continued to push for large-scale development and pushed for ... developer giveaways." *Exh. 1 at p. 3*. The question is whether those allegations adequately allege an ethical violation under either MICC 2.60.030 or RCW ch. 42.23.

A. MICC §2.60.030

MICC 2.60.030 broadly prohibits five types of action by city officials: conflicts of interest (§A), misuse of public position or resources (§B), representation of third parties (§C), receipt of gifts and favors (§D), and misuse of confidential information (§E). Each of these are examined in turn.

1. Conflicts of Interest (MICC 2.60.030.A)

Under subsection A of MICC 2.60.030 ("Conflicts of Interest"), a city official is prohibited from participating in any "government decisions" in which he/she has a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is presumed to exist whenever the official, his/her spouse, anyone he/she lives with, or "an entity that the official serves as an employee, officer, director, trustee, partner or owner" has "a financial interest that relates to a government decision." A "financial interest" is presumed if one of the listed individuals/entities "stands to incur material financial gain or loss as a result of a decision under consideration by the city." *Id*.

Based on the language of MICC 2.60.030.A, the complaint here must allege three specific elements in order to be deemed sufficient under that subsection: (1) that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli serves "the representatives of the New Farmer's Market Building" as an "employee, officer, director, trustee, partner, or owner;" (2) that the "representatives of the new Farmer's Market Building" stand to incur material financial gain "as a result of a decision under consideration by the city;" and (3) that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is "participating in" that decision.

a. "Employee, Officer, Director, Partner, or Owner"

Regarding the first element, the complaint alleges a private entity has "hired" Ms. Pirzio-Biroli to offer advice on the type of development allowed under the city code. However, the complaint does not explicitly allege Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is serving as an "employee, officer, director, trustee, partner or owner." In fact, the type of analysis and advice for which Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has allegedly been hired – to evaluate the comprehensive plan and provide advice on potential development – typically occurs in the consultant/independent contractor context. And though it may seem there is little difference between an employee and a consultant/contractor for purposes of determining whether a DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY - 4

conflict of interest exists, the fact that the City Code explicitly mentions "employee," but does not mention "consultant/contractor," is important.

Our courts have developed a variety of principles to guide lawyers and judges in the interpretation and application of statutory language. One of the more widely-cited maxims of statutory construction is the Latin phrase "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which broadly means "the explicit mention of one thing means the exclusion of another." For example, if a sign in a store window says "no animals allowed," the prohibition would apply to animals of any kind. However, if the sign reads "no cats, lizards, or birds allowed," one can presume that all other animals are allowed. In other words, since the sign lists specific types of animals that are excluded, traditional principles of legal interpretation would mean that animals not specifically listed will not be excluded.

Here, the City Code contains a list of specific roles that city officials are prohibited from performing for entities with pending financial interests in city decisions: employee, officer, director, trustee, partner or owner. *MICC 2.60.030.A.* Well-established rules of statutory interpretation dictate that the explicit listing of those prohibited roles means other roles <u>not</u> specifically listed are <u>not</u> prohibited. The present complaint against Ms. Pirzio-Biroli does not specifically allege she serves in any of the roles explicitly prohibited by the code section, and the nature of the work she is alleged to be performing is most typically performed in a consultant/contractor role, which is <u>not</u> explicitly prohibited.³

As a result, because the complaint does not describe the specific nature of the role for which Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is alleged to have been "hired," and because the specific nature of

³ Under MICC 2.6.050.B, the ethics officer "may recommend changes or additions to this code of ethics to the city council." The undersigned recognizes the above analysis may be contrary to the council's intent with regard to conflicts of interest for city officials. If that is the case, MICC 2.60.030.A could easily be amended to prohibit a consultant/contractor relationship either by adding "consultant/contractor" to the list of prohibited positions, or by adding a catch-all provision (*i.e.*, "any similar position involving payment for services").

the role appears relevant under the city code, I am compelled to conclude that the complaint "provides too little detail for the ethics officer to reach a determination" regarding a violation of MICC 2.60.030.A. *MICC* 2.60.070.A.2.

b. "Financial Interest" in a "Decision Under Consideration by The City"

Despite having found that the complaint provides too little detail regarding the nature of Ms. Pirzio-Biroli's alleged relationship with an outside entity under MICC 2.60.030.A, the undersigned believes analysis of the remaining questions under that subsection may be instructive for the complaining parties, the City Council, and the public.⁴

As indicated above, even if a city official were actually employed by a private entity, a conflict of interest would only exist if that entity had a "financial interest [in]...a decision under consideration by the city." *MICC 2.60.030.A*. Here, the only entity/ies identified in the complaint are "the representatives of the new Farmer's Market Building." *Exh. 1, p. 2*. While the complaint alleges Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is advising that entity on "what is and is not possible under the city's codes," and claims that the entity is "a developer actively pursuing a development on the island," it goes no further to identify any specific pending development application, or any other decision under consideration by the city in which the entity may have a financial interest.

⁴ Since the City's ethics code is relatively new and untested, it may be instructive to all concerned parties how the ethics code is likely to be analyzed and applied in the future, even if that analysis it is not dispositive to the current complaint.

⁵ As noted both above and below, the ethical prohibitions under MICC 2.60.030.A depend largely on the specific identity of the entity alleged to be employing a city official, or alleged to have a financial interest in a city decision. Here, the only description of the entity at issue is "representatives of the New Farmer's Market Building." The entity is not identified by name, there is no indication whether it is a property developer, a property owner, a property manager, merely a representative of such entity, or even whether it is an individual or a corporation or non-profit entity. While the identity of the entity may be clear to someone familiar with the background here, the ethics official is limited to the text of the complaint. For purposes of this determination of sufficiency, the undersigned presumes the entity at issue is a property developer with both prior and planned development in the City.

This distinction is important, as employment with an outside entity with <u>no</u> financial interest in any decision currently under consideration does not appear to be prohibited by MICC 2.60.030.A. In other words, MICC 2.60.030.A does not prohibit a Planning Commission member – or any other city official – from being employed by a private developer unless and until that developer attains a financial interest in the outcome of a decision actively under consideration by the City; *i.e.*, by submitting a development proposal or application, or otherwise seeking some City action or approval. Similarly, even if MICC 2.60.030.A were amended to include "consultant/contractor" as a prohibited position, the prohibition would not appear to apply if the terms of the consultancy/contract were completed prior to the entity's request for a specific city decision.⁶

This interpretation – limiting the application of ethical prohibitions to current/ongoing conflicts – is consistent with how such statutes are generally drafted, interpreted, and applied. For example, it is not unheard of for city planners or other planning staff to have prior experience in private sector development. Were ethical provisions to prohibit such prior experience, they may automatically exclude a wide swath of qualified candidates from public service, especially in areas where prior professional experience is most helpful to the governmental entity and the public it serves.

Applying that generally-accepted interpretation to the present case (and assuming Ms. Pirzio-Biroli is actually an *employee* of a private developer), the complaint does not identify any current "decision under consideration by the city" in which the developer has a financial interest. As a result, the August 3, 2020 complaint against Ms. Pirzio-Biroli fails to establish this element of MICC 2.60.030.A.

⁶ To be clear, this discussion only addresses subsection A of MICC 2.60.030. Depending on the facts, such outside employment may still run afoul of other ethical provisions discussed below.

c. Participation in a City Decision

Third, it is important to note that MICC 2.60.030.A does not make it *per se* unethical for a city official to have private sector employment anytime his/her employer has a financial interest in a decision under consideration by the City. Rather, the Code simply prohibits an official in such a situation from participating in the relevant decision-making process. *MICC* 25.60.030.A. Here, even if the complaint alleged Ms. Pirzio-Biroli was employed by a private entity in a manner explicitly prohibited by the city code, and even if that entity had a financial interest in a decision currently under consideration by the City, it would still be required to allege that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli was *actually participating in* the decision-making process. The complaint makes no such allegation, and therefore again fails to establish this element of MICC 2.6.030.A.

2. Misuse of Public Position or Resources (MICC 2.60.030.B)

Subsection B of MICC 2.60.030 prohibits officials from using public services (staff time, equipment, supplies, etc.) for non-city purposes. The complaint here does not allege any violation of this section, nor any facts that would arguably amount to such a violation.

3. Representation of Third Parties (MICC 2.60.030.C)

Subsection C of MICC 2.60.030 prohibits city officials from "appear[ing] on behalf of the financial interests of third parties" either (1) before the body on which the official serves, or (2) in interactions with city staff. The complaint here makes no allegation that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has appeared before the Planning Commission – the body on which she serves – on behalf of any outside entity, or that she has otherwise interacted with City staff on behalf of such an entity. Consequently, the complaint does not allege a violation of this subsection.

4. Gifts and Favors (MICC 2.60.030.D)

Subsection D of MICC 2.60.030 generally prohibits an official from soliciting or receiving "anything of monetary value" if it was – or may appear to a reasonable person to have been – given/received in exchange for some "special consideration or influence as to any action by the official in their official capacity." Here, the complaint alleges Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has been "hired" to advise an outside developer. The term "hired" – regardless whether as an "employee" or a consultant/contractor – undoubtedly implies payment of money, and therefore clearly qualifies as a thing "of monetary value." The dispositive question, then, is whether the complaint adequately alleges either (1) the developer hired Ms. Pirzio-Biroli with the intent to "obtain special consideration or influence," or (2) that it would appear to a reasonable person she was hired for that purpose. *MICC 2.60.030.D*. Based on the text of the complaint, it *does* appear to make such an allegation in two respects.

First, as mentioned above, in addition to alleging Ms. Pirzio-Biroli receives financial compensation from an outside developer, the complaint alleges Ms. Pirzio-Biroli "has ignored feedback consistently, continued to push for large-scale development and pushed for what I call developer giveaways." *Exh. 1 at p. 3*. In reading the overall context of the complaint, it appears to draw a connection between Ms. Pirzio-Biroli's alleged outside employment and her alleged preferential treatment of developers in her role on the Planning Commission. In other words, the complaint appears not only to allege that the outside developer hired Ms. Pirzio-Biroli *with the intent* to obtain special consideration or influence, but that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has *actually provided* such special consideration or influence.

Second, even if the complaint did not specifically allege Ms. Pirzio-Biroli had exhibited preferential treatment for developers, the complaint would likely be sufficient to allege a violation of MICC 2.60.030.D anyway. Under the Mercer Island City Code, the role DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY - 9

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of the Planning Commission is to "review and make recommendations on amendments to the comprehensive plan...[and] development regulations." MICC 3.46.020.A-B. The Planning Commission also "makes recommendations to the city council on land use regulations, comprehensive plan amendments and quasi-judicial matters." MICC 19.15.010.C.2. These are clearly areas in which private developers have particularly strong legal and financial interests. Consequently, the relationship between developers and the Planning Commission is such that anytime a member of the Planning Commission is employed by a developer, or anytime a developer otherwise pays a member of the Planning Commission for any services rendered, it may arguably appear "to a reasonable person... to have been solicited, received, or given with intent to give or obtain special treatment or consideration or influence." MICC 2.60.030.D.1.

This is particularly true here, because the work Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has allegedly been hired to perform - reviewing a comprehensive plan and determining what type of development is allowed – is so essential to property development that even small-scale developers typically perform such work in-house, or have close associations with outside experts they repeatedly use for such work. Simply put, when a developer allegedly hires a Planning Commission member to do work that developers are typically equipped to do themselves, it would be no surprise that a reasonable disinterested person would conclude some special consideration or influence was being sought or provided. The complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of MICC 2.60.030D. ⁷

⁷ It bears repeating that the Ethics Officer here makes no conclusions regarding the truth of the allegations against Ms. Pirzio-Biroli, or whether there are additional facts and circumstances that may explain or excuse any particular action or arrangement here. The role of the Ethics Officer is solely to determine whether a sufficient allegation has been made based on the facts as alleged.

5. <u>Confidential Information (MICC 2.60.030.E)</u>

Subsection E of MICC 2.60.030 prohibits public officials from disclosing or using "any confidential information gained by reason of their official position for other than a city purpose." While a violation of this section may be arguably implied by the complaint here, the specific allegation appears to be that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has given developers preferential treatment, not that she has used or disclosed any confidential information gained by virtue of her position. As a result, the complaint is insufficient to allege a violation of MICC 2.6.030.E.

B. RCW Chapter 42.23

Under MICC 2.6.070.A.2, city officials are also subject to the ethical requirements of RCW 42.23, so a complaint is sufficient if it alleges a violation of that chapter. RCW 42.23 includes two subsections that outline prohibited actions for municipal officials: (1) RCW 42.23.030-.050, which prohibit a city official from having a personal interest in any contract to which the city is a party, and (2) RCW 42.23.070, which contains a list of four separate "prohibited acts." Each provision is examined below.

1. RCW42.23.030-050: Interests in Contracts

As discussed above, the complaint here does not allege that the entity who has "hired" Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has any interest in any decision currently under consideration by the City of Mercer Island. Moreover, as a developer, the only interest such an entity would likely have is in the outcome of a development permit application, which would not meet the definition of "contract" under RCW 4.23.020 ("contract, sale, lease or purchase"). For this

and other reasons⁸, the complaint here is not sufficient to allege a violation of RCW 42.23.030-050.

2. RCW 42.23.070: Prohibited Acts

Subsection (1) of RCW42.23.070 prohibits a city official from "us[ing] his or her position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself, herself, or others." As used in the law, "special privileges or exemptions" traditionally means a benefit to which another member of the public would not ordinarily be entitled. Here, while the complaint appears to allege Ms. Pirzio-Biroli appears to be "pro-developer" in her role on the Planning Commission, it does not allege she has given any specific developer any privilege or exemption to which another developer or citizen would not be otherwise entitled.

Subsection (2) prohibits a city official from receiving "any compensation... from a source other than the employing municipality, for a matter connected with or related to the officer's services as such an officer." Here, the complaint alleges Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has received compensation for advising an outside developer on the types of development available under the city code. Since advice on city development is clearly "related to [Ms. Pirzio-Biroli's] services as" a member of the Planning Commission, the complaint here adequately alleges a violation of this subsection.

Subsection (3) prohibits a city official from accepting any employment or engaging in any other "business or professional activity" that the official "might reasonably expect would require or induce him or her...to disclose confidential information acquired by reason of his or her official position." To be clear, this section does not require *actual disclosure* of

⁸ For example, RCW 42.23.040 allows a city official to be an employee of an outside entity if (1) "the compensation of such employee or agent consists entirely of fixed wages or salary," (2) the relationship is disclosed prior to any decision on the contract, and (3) the official takes no part in the vote. The complaint here makes no allegation regarding the nature of the compensation, or that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has taken part in any votes on any specific contract.

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any confidential information; it more broadly prohibits any situation in which the official might reasonably expect that such disclosure would be required or induced. This section sets a fairly low bar, and the allegations made in the complaint appear sufficient here.

If, as the complaint alleges, Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has been hired by an outside developer to offer advice on development under the city code, there are a variety of situations in which she might "reasonably expect" to feel a responsibility or inducement to disclose confidential information she has acquired by reason of her official position. The same would be true of any member of a planning commission employed in a similar capacity by a private developer: her/she "might reasonably expect" that such employment would induce the disclosure of confidential information gained by virtue of his/her official position. For example, if a member of the Planning Commission became aware the City Council was confidentially considering a moratorium on a certain type of development, and the member were employed by a developer with specific plans to pursue that type of development, it is reasonable to expect the member would feel pressure to disclose that information to his/her employer. In fact, failure to do so may violate his/her ethical responsibilities to the employer. It is that sort of ethical Catch-22 that statutes like RCW 42.23.070 were intended to avoid. Consequently, I am compelled to conclude that the complaint here sufficiently alleges a violation of RCW 42.23.070(3).

Subsection (4) of RCW 42.23.070 prohibits the actual disclosure of confidential information. Here, the complaint makes no allegations that Ms. Pirzio-Biroli has actually disclosed any confidential information gained by reason of her official position, so it does not sufficiently allege a violation of this section.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to my authority as Ethics Officer for the City of Mercer Island, I conclude as follows:

The August 3, 2020 complaint against Planning Commission Member Lucia Pirzio-Biroli <u>IS SUFFICIENT</u> to allege a violation of the following standards: MICC 2.60.030.D, RCW 42.23.070(2), and RCW 42.23.070(3).

It is <u>NOT SUFFICIENT</u> to allege a violation of any other provision of MICC 2.60.030 or RCW ch. 42.23.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2020.

Bv:

Jeremy W. Culumber, WSBA #35423 Mercer Island Ethics Officer